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Abstract  
Whilst much has been written about the opportunities and perils of Green participation in national 
coalition governments, analysis of Greens supporting minority government is less common, and has 
not focused on comparative-historical trends as this paper does.  We look beyond single case studies 
of Green-supported minority government in order to establish historical party trajectories and policy 
impact over time in three countries with different political systems. The extent of the comparative 
work here has never previously been undertaken and establishes that repeat instances of such 
support can provide the basis for more stable and effective future inter-party governing 
relationships. However, we argue that, whilst trust can build between parties to minority 
government arrangements over decades, it is not assured, and, whilst Green parties may achieve 
ministerial control after repeat instances of supporting minority government, the benefits of doing 
so are not guaranteed. 
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Stepping-Stone, Halfway House or Road to Nowhere?  
Green Support of Minority Government in Sweden, New Zealand, and Australia 
 
Abstract  
Whilst much has been written about the opportunities and perils of Green participation in national 
coalition governments, analysis of Greens supporting minority government is less common, and has 
not focused on comparative-historical trends as this paper does.  We look beyond single case studies 
of Green-supported minority government in order to establish historical party trajectories and policy 
impact over time in three countries with different political systems. The extent of the comparative 
work here has never previously been undertaken and establishes that repeat instances of such 
support can provide the basis for more stable and effective future inter-party governing 
relationships. However, we argue that, whilst trust can build between parties to minority 
government arrangements over decades, it is not assured, and, whilst Green parties may achieve 
ministerial control after repeat instances of supporting minority government, the benefits of doing 
so are not guaranteed.	
 
Introduction 	
Green parties have persisted and proliferated over the last several decades, but there is no consistent 
manner in which they have joined or supported governments, given the differing electoral systems 
and political opportunities and barriers they have encountered. Gahrton (2015) identifies four key 
types of participation: individual co-optation where a Green personality is individually co-opted 
into government; resilience-creating where Greens join government, not because their numbers are 
required, but because they provide resilience; necessity-based where Green participation is needed 
to achieve a parliamentary majority; and legitimacy-creatingi where Greens support minority 
government, which is the concern of this paper. It is less typical for Greens to support minority 
government than join coalitions, with Green parties having significant coalition experience in 
Eastern and Western Europe. Besides many instances of individual co-optation, there have been 
resilience-creating and necessity-based arrangements in a total of ten European countries, but 
legitimacy-creating minority government support arrangements in only two (Gahrton, 2015: 84).  
 Support of minority government by Green parties is a ‘toleration’ approach, (Rüdig 2002: 
28-9), favoured by Green parties at the regional level in Germany and Tasmania, and at the national 
level in Sweden and New Zealand (p. 22). It remains a rare occurrence. Between 1990-2006, the 
Swedish Greens were the only Green party in Western Europe that supported minority government 
rather than join coalition government (Rihoux and Rüdig 2006). And in Eastern Europe between 
1990-2003 Green parties supported government exclusively in coalition (Rüdig 2006). In Denmark 
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and Sweden (Gahrton 2015), Green parties have joined coalitions to help form (rather than support) 
minority governments. Otherwise, the only other recent examples of Greens supporting national 
minority government were in Australia (2010-13), New Zealand (2005-8) and Portugal (Lisi 2016).  
This paper compares and contrasts three very different experiences of Greens supporting 
minority governments, at various times, when they did not hold ministerial portfolios, in Sweden, 
New Zealand and Australiaii. These instances of Greens supporting minority governments involved 
support arrangements with social-democratic governments that lasted the whole or most of the 
government’s term and were largely based on written agreements outlining specific areas of policy 
co-operation, or policy trade-offs in exchange for ‘confidence and supply’, although in differing 
parliamentary and electoral systems and contexts (Tables Four and Five). In addition, the repeat 
experiences in Sweden and New Zealand, over sixteen and seventeen years respectively, can be 
contrasted with the recent first-time experience in Australia. 
We are interested in where Green support of minority government leads, if anywhere, after 
such repeat instances. Is it a stepping-stone, a halfway house or a road to nowhere in terms of 
support of, or participation in, subsequent governments? And given that it is more tenuous than 
coalition, does it nevertheless offer policy benefits sufficient to insulate Greens against subsequent 
electoral loss? We explore party trajectory and policy gain across three countries over twenty years 
and in doing so inevitably identify further questions. How does the political trajectory of Green 
parties differ from others that support minority government, for example? How do Green policy 
gains in support circumstances differ from gains in coalition? And what do Green members think 
about the costs and benefits of supporting government? These are all questions for future research. 
 
Political Trajectory, Minority Government and Policy Impact 	
The political trajectory of Green parties warrants consideration for a number of reasons, including 
the significance of their ability to displace votes from other parties, and the various ways in which 
they work in differing circumstances to impact upon policy. Pederson (1982: 3) suggests that the 
mapping and analytic discussion of minor parties, including consideration ‘of their origins, their 
fates, and their political impacts’, can be aided by the construction of a party lifespan heuristic. 
According to this, parties will eventually pass – or avoid – important thresholds as they increase or 
decrease in strength. These include: declaration as a party; authorisation in being able to contest 
elections; representation where parliamentary seats are gained; and finally, relevance in terms of 
helping form government (Pederson 1982). Although Pederson sees relevance as difficult to define, 
Müller-Rommel (2002: 3) suggests that it refers to ‘the impact of small parties on government 
formation and government policy output (ideally as coalition partners in national governments).’ 
Furthermore, the passing of the threshold of relevance has correlated, for most European Green 
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parties, with sustained electoral performance that in turn has ‘strengthened both the organisational 
structure and the overall stability of the Greens in these countries’ (Müller-Rommel 2002: 7). It is 
less clear, however, whether this is true of Green parties that have supported minority governments, 
nor what was actually delivered in (Green) policy terms as a result of enhanced influence. 	
Of course, political trajectory is always specific to context and circumstance (Rihoux and Rüdig 
2006: S10). Parties will cross Pederson’s thresholds more easily, for example, in countries with an 
electoral system of proportional representation. In Westminster systems, it is rare for the Greens to 
cross the representation threshold at all, with only one Green currently in each of the United 
Kingdom, Canadian and Australian lower houses of parliament. The Green vote may build in a 
Westminster system, as it has in Australia (Table Three), but without translation into the number of 
seats in parliament that proportional representation would deliver (Table One). Equally significant 
is the nature of the party system. Two-party dominant Westminster systems such as Australia’s, for 
example, would not typically return minority governments, which are the norm for multi-party 
systems such as Denmark’s and Norway’s. It can happen however (Russell 2008) as it has 
occasionally in the United Kingdom (Paun 2011) and does with regularity in Canada where there is 
no tradition of coalition formation (Conley 2011). However, the Greens have not yet supported 
national government in either of these countries. By contrast, in multi-party systems it is more 
typical for Greens to join governing coalitions (Rihoux and Rüdig 2006), although the Swedish and 
New Zealand Greens only contemplated forming a coalition and an alliance respectively after 
several earlier experiences of supporting national minority government. 
It is important then to acknowledge that the political trajectory of Green parties, and their policy 
impact, relies on favourable institutional and political conditions (Rihoux and Rüdig 2006: S10) 
that will vary at differing times in differing circumstances and shift over time. The three cases 
examined here differ in terms of parliamentary and voting systems, with Sweden and New Zealand 
both being unitary systems, Sweden with proportional representation and New Zealand with mixed-
member proportional, and Australia having a bicameral, federal parliament with proportional 
representation in the Senate and a preferential system in the House of Representatives. As discussed 
below, these differing systems have resulted in different political trajectories. Furthermore, our 
analysis of circumstances in Sweden, New Zealand and Australia shows that Pederson’s shift from 
representation to relevance is not easily executed for a minor party, and, in each of these cases, was 
initially presented as an invitation to support minority government. Such an invitation offers a 
pathway to subsequent participation in government, however the immediate focus by the minor 
parties at such times is upon policy gain, as we have seen recently in the United Kingdom (ABC 
2017), and in British Columbia (BCGC and BCNDC 2017). Strom (1990: 38) observes that minor 
parties in these circumstances are highly likely to be motivated by policy seeking rather than office-
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seeking behaviour. The invitations to support minority government were propitious in each of our 
cases for offering potential policy gain, but also for providing the opportunity to develop trust and 
familiarity between Green and social-democratic parties as the basis for improved future governing 
relationships. Only after repeated experiences of supporting minority government in Sweden and 
New Zealand were the Greens offered ministries, respectively within and outside of, social-
democratic minority government, and with them potentially enhanced policy leverage. 
In terms of research methodology, we collected primary (debates, party manifestos, agreements, 
election results and press releases), and secondary textual information, and subjected it to 
comparative-historical analysis. This assisted in our charting of the political trajectory of Green 
parties that have supported minority government, their crossing of Pederson’s threshold of 
relevance, and our determining of any subsequent policy influence. Patterns over time, including 
support details and agreements, party positioning, electoral results and trends in major and minor-
party support, are identified, debated and discussed (Tables Four and Five). We discern comparative 
results that facilitate a discussion and assessment of the impact of Green support of minority 
government in terms of party trajectory and policy gain.  
Determining the policy impact of a minor party that has supported minority government is more 
difficult (Pederson 1982: 3), given that the literature equates generic policy impact with the tangible 
indicators of office, portfolios and votes (Elklit 1999: 82-3), whilst the Greens literature is often 
focused on policy constraints and lack of influence.  Here we review primary and secondary 
documentation in order to comparatively establish influence where Greens cross what we are 
calling a ‘policy impact threshold’ as a nuance of Pederson’s (1982) various thresholds. We 
describe influence by distinguishing between three types of policy reforms: signature reforms or 
achievements sought by Greens in return for supporting minority government; parliamentary and 
policy-based process reforms that Greens routinely seek; and crash through or crash reforms that 
can make or break a governing arrangement (Crowley 2003). 
In the remainder of this paper we address our primary research concerns: the experience and 
trajectory (and indeed the comparative trajectory), of national Green parties that have supported 
minority government; and the Green policy gains or impacts in these circumstances. Whilst the 
experience of Green parties in national coalition governments is now well documented, we consider 
the less common minority government experience. Our paper is inspired by the scholarly attention 
that has focused to date on this latter experience (for example Bale 2003; Bale and Bergman 2006a, 
2006b; Bale and Dann 2002; Burchell 2001, 2002; Hazell and Paun 2009), and expands upon and 
updates the comparative work, with greater emphasis on party trajectory over time and policy 
outcomes. We consider whether such arrangements proved, over time, to be a stepping stone, a 
halfway house or a road to nowhere in terms of leading to Green participation in subsequent 
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governments, and what they delivered, if anything, in terms of Green policy gains and enhanced 
influence. 
 
Supporting National Minority Government  
National-level Green parties arose in Sweden, New Zealand (Gahrton 2015) and Australia 
(Miragliotta 2006) in differing contexts but prompted by the common failure of the major parties to 
adequately articulate environmental concern. In Sweden and Australia their formation was preceded 
by subnational Green party activity that afforded the Greens significant prior experience to draw 
upon when they entered national parliaments (Burchell 2001; Miragliotta 2012). This was achieved 
in 1988 in Sweden, in 1996 in Australia’s Senate, and in 1999 in New Zealand after the shift there 
to a mixed-member proportional representation (MMP) electoral system. Greens in each country 
have since supported social-democratic minority governments: three times in Sweden, four times in 
New Zealand, and once only recently in Australia. Since entering parliament, the Green vote has 
predominantly risen over the long term in each country, with dips at times, however, for example in 
Australia in 2013 after supporting minority government, but also due to other party-political and 
broader contextual factors. In this sense, while the three instances occurred in different electoral and 
parliamentary systems, they reveal similar party trajectories, with differing details, but similar 
timelines, opportunities and outcomes, and a common decline in support for social democrats. Each 
case will be examined in novel fashion in terms of the literature thus far, namely to establish Green 
political trajectory and minority government support circumstances, before considering the policy 
leverage that may have been achieved at various times.  
 
Sweden  
The Swedish Greens, Miljöpartiet de Gröna, founded in 1981, first entered Sweden’s unicameral 
legislature (Rikstag) in 1988 aided by an electoral system of proportional representation. They have 
since supported the Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet (SAP) in minority government in 1998 and 
in 2002 (both with the Left party), before achieving coalition status in 2014 when they entered a 
coalition minority government with the SAP, which included Green ministers for the first time. 
Whilst the trajectory of the Greens’ vote (Table One) has been marginally upwards since 1998, with 
no significant dips before 2018, support for the Greens has oscillated, at times dangerously close to 
the four per cent threshold required to win seats (Johnson 2016). The poor 2018 results show the 
electoral impact of the Greens' policy difficulties and backflips, on immigration in particular, and 
arguably that voters are more comfortable with Greens supporting rather than forming government 
(Anderson and Erlanger 2018). Despite promising beginnings (Hinde 2014), the Greens struggled in 
office, with two ministers resigning and criticism of their lack of impact on energy, transport, and 
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immigration policy (Duxbury 2017). Whilst the lead-up to the 2018 election had been dominated by 
anti-immigration politics, heatwaves and wildfires briefly refocused debate on climate change and 
environmental issues (Henden 2018). The party lost half its membership after joining government 
(MSE 2018) and achieved its lowest vote for twenty years at the 2018 poll (Table One) however in 
circumstances that also saw Sweden’s left-right bloc politics disrupted by an anti-immigrant party.	
 In terms of their earlier support of minority government, in 1998 and 2002, the Greens 
secured ‘toleration’ (Rüdig 2002) agreements with the SAP, delivering it two full terms in office as 
a minority government, initially exchanging their support for cooperation on select issues of 
concern to both parties (Table Five). The Greens had pioneered similar minority government 
support agreements during the late 1980s and 1990s at the municipal level, which allowed the party 
‘to disassociate itself from policies that it could not tolerate’ (Burchell 2001: 246). Bale and 
Bergman refer to these agreements in general as ‘contract parliamentarianism’ and note that, over 
the 1990s in Sweden and New Zealand, they became ‘longer and more specific’, both symbolizing 
and institutionalizing ‘a developing system of not so much minority government as minority 
governance’ (2006b: 432). The parties agreed in 1998 to cooperate on ‘the economy (the state 
budget), employment, distributive justice, gender equity and the environment’ (Bale and Bergman, 
2006b: 433). The scope of issues expanded considerably in the 2002 iteration, with broad areas 
complemented by more specific detail, as well as detailed coordinating and advisory staffing 
arrangements, joint press conferences and regular party leaders’ meetings (Bale and Bergman 
2006b). 	
These agreements ensured that the Greens retained their independence, thereby mollifying 
their base, whilst allowing them to demonstrate competence and reliability in dealing with policy 
and legislation but left them frustrated over their lack of influence (Bale and Bergman 2006a; 
Burchell 2001; 2002). Nevertheless, in the wake of the 1998 and 2002 experiences, their electoral 
support marginally improved. The party had learned, from its extensive participation within and 
support of local governments, how to move beyond parliamentary representation to relevance, 
including making an impact on policy (Burchell 2001). Invariably this involved working with other 
parties. After the SAP lost government in 2006, the Greens and the Left briefly joined it in a ‘Red-
Green Alliance’, which earned an increase in support for the Greens in 2010 but saw the SAP 
continue to decline (Aylott and Bolin 2015). This placed the Greens in a stronger position to 
achieve the coalition status they had previously been seeking (Burchell 2008) and led to their 
entering two-party coalition minority government with SAP in 2014 (Gahrton 2015). Foremost on 
the Greens’ agenda in government were environmental taxes, forestry restrictions, no new 
Stockholm bypass, and nuclear reactor closures, which set them up for conflict with their coalition 
partner (Aylott and Bolin 2015).	
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Table One: Swedish Greens' general election results 1998-2014 
 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 
Percentage of vote 4.5 4.6 5.2 7.3 6.9 4.3 
Seats won 16 17 19 25 25 15 
Impact of 
supporting minority 
government 
Not  
applicable 
0.1% gain 0.6% gain Not 
applicable 
Not  
applicable 
2.6% loss after 
joining 
minority 
coalition 
Sources:  Swedish Electoral Authority http://www.val.se/val_och_folkomrostningar/; Burchell (2008); Aylott and Bolin 
(2015).	
 
New Zealand  
The Green Party of Aotearoa-New Zealand, founded in 1990iii, first entered New Zealand’s unitary, 
unicameral legislature (Pāremata Aotearoa) in 1996 aided by the newly introduced system of 
mixed-member proportional voting (MMP) and a five per cent electoral threshold. After leaving a 
leftist Alliance, seven Greens were elected in 1999. The Greens then supported Labour in minority 
government for three terms until it lost the 2008 election. Over this time the Green vote grew, 
peaking at 11% (Table Two), nearly double the Swedish Greens’ highest vote, and positioning the 
party for the striking of a co-operative Labour-Green Alliance in 2016 (LGA) (Edwards 2017). This 
saw Labour and the Greens coordinate parliamentary business and investigate joint policy and/or a 
joint election campaign between the parties, with ‘no surprises’, but did not rule out working with 
other parties (Roy 2016). In 2017, Labour formed minority government with the populist New 
Zealand First (NZF) party which otherwise would have supported the Nationals, with the Greens 
holding their first ministries but outside of Cabinet (Hurley and Gower 2017). Besides holding 
portfolios but not sharing office, which constrains their influence and performance, the Greens’ role 
is to ensure confidence and supply for the minority coalition government (Roy 2017; Small 2017). 	
Whilst the Swedish SAP had only the Greens and the Left to deal with as support parties, the 
New Zealand situation began as more complicated, with an abundance of splinter parties vying for 
involvement. In 1999, Labour formed a coalition minority government with the leftist Alliance 
(New Labour, the Democrats, the Liberal Party and Mana Motuhake) and arranged only an 
unwritten agreement with the Greens in which the latter agreed to support the government on 
confidence and supply (Bale and Bergman 2006b). The government did agree to keep the Greens 
informed and to listen to their suggestions on an ad hoc basis, however relations between the parties 
were severely strained over policy and the Greens’ feeling that they were often ignored or taken 
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advantage of (Bale and Dann 2002).  The Greens became a de facto opposition pursuing their own 
policies, for example on animal welfare, and their opposition to New Zealand’s role in the war in 
Afghanistan (Bale 2003) and the government’s support of genetically modified (GM) crops (Bale, 
2003; Bale and Bergman, 2006a; 2006b). Not surprisingly, then, after the 2002 election Labour 
formed a minority coalition government with the Progressive Party and secured a confidence and 
supply agreement with the centrist United Future Party, while striking only a lesser cooperation 
agreement with the Greens (Yong 2009).	
However, agreements with the Greens in 1999, 2002, 2005 and 2017 (Table Five) showed the 
parties learned the lessons of cooperation that secured a range of near-full term governmentsiv. The 
2002 agreement was based on cooperation, good faith and consultation on shared policy, providing 
for procedural matters, while securing confidence and supply from the Greens (Yong 2009). In 
2005, the Greens struck a similar agreement with the difference that they agreed not to withdraw 
confidence and supply, but this time in return for the right to develop policy and to provide 
spokespersons on issues (NZLP and GPANZ 2005). Meanwhile, two smaller support parties, which 
would not countenance Greens in government, signed innovative ‘enhanced confidence and supply 
agreements’ that delivered them ministerial positions outside Cabinet (Yong 2009: 43). This 
informed the Confidence and Supply Agreement (NZLP and GPANZ 2017) that delivered the 
Greens their first ministries. The Greens will be tested on multiple fronts, (in terms of policy 
delivery, compromise, disappointments, and the consequences for membership and support), with 
limited capacity in their half-way house outside government (Cooke 2018; Espiner 2018).  
 
Table Two: New Zealand Greens' general election results 1999-2017 
 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 
Percentage vote 5.16/4.21a 7 5 6.72 11 10.70 6.3 
Seats won 7 9 6 9 14 14 8 
Impact of supporting 
minority 
government 
Not 
applicable 
c.2-3% 
gain a 
2% loss 1.72% gain Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
a. The first percentage is the party list result, the second for individual electorates. 1999 is the only election at which the 
Greens achieved an electorate seat.  
Source:  NZEC 2017. 
 
Australia  
Unlike Sweden and New Zealand, Australia is a federation with a bicameral national (federal) 
parliament and government formed in the lower house, the House of Representatives (HR), 
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although the elected Senate (S) has almost equal powers. Following several false starts, the 
Australian Greens (AG) party was founded in 1992 as a confederation of long-established 
subnational (state-level) parties that formalized candidates under the Australian Greens banner for 
the first time at the 1996 election (Miragliotta 2012). Although various green politicians had 
previously sat in the Senate, aided by a proportional representation (PR) system, the AG gained 
their first Senate seats in 1996, and HR seat in 2002 at the Cunningham by-election. The trajectory 
of their vote has been from 2.14 per cent (HR)/2.17 per cent (S) in 1998, to a high in 2010 of 11.76 
per cent (HR)/13.11 per cent (S), with a significant slump in 2013 after supporting the Labor 
minority government, which was extremely unpopular (Table Three). While the vote rose again in 
the HR in 2016, it increased only marginally in the Senate, perhaps reflecting the increasing 
diversity of candidates, and thus increased competition, in this chamber. The Greens currently have 
nine senators, however the HR’s preferential system, which requires 50 per cent plus one vote for a 
candidate to be elected, is a formidable obstacle to minor-party representation. The major parties, 
Labor and the Coalition (the Liberal and National parties), are therefore dominant. The Greens have 
supported only one national minority government and have never formed a national coalition 
government, although state-level Green parties have been the sole support for minority governments 
on numerous occasions, at times with Cabinet positions. 	
 The 2010 election result was a breakthrough for the Greens on a number of fronts. They 
achieved an electoral high with a double-digit vote in both houses, which in Sweden or New 
Zealand would have made them a coalition contender with nearly twenty HR seats, rather than one. 
They gained the balance of power in both houses (McCann 2012), albeit shared in the lower housev, 
and were then relied upon to support a Labor minority government (Costar 2012). Their success 
was attributed to the popularity of leader Bob Brown, his support for the government’s stimulus 
response to the global financial crisis, the fading popularity of the internally destructive Labor 
government and a lack of trust in the major parties (MacAllister et al. 2012). Labor and the Greens 
negotiated a four-page agreement, modest in comparison to the 33-page, multi-billion-dollar 
agreement with the regional independents. In return for their support (i.e. supply and confidence), 
the Greens received policy deals, including a commitment to national carbon pricing, and 
procedural concessions (AG-ALP 2010).	
 In Australia’s ‘majoritarian’, two-party dominant Westminster system, there had been only 
one other experience of federal minority government, and the new Labor minority government was 
attacked as unstable and incompetent from the outset (Hartcher 2010). Agreements with the 
Greens and independents were key to the government running full term despite internal tensions, a 
leadership change, strained relations between the government and the Greens and the independents 
who supported it, and the upheaval caused by reform (Swan 2014). Although this first-time 
Stepping-Stone, Halfway House or Road to Nowhere? 
	
11	
experience is very recent, Green parties in Australia have had two decades of supporting state 
minority government and their leader and deputy personally understood the challenges (Crowley 
2003). However, the growth of the national Green vote from 1998 parallels the decline in Labor’s 
vote (Table Four), so to keep faith with both their bases, Labor distanced itself from the Greens 
early in the government (Gillard 2011) and the Greens abandoned the increasingly besieged 
government prior to the election (Milne 2013)vi. Labor lost office in 2013 and failed to regain it in 
2016, and Labor-Green relations remain strained today (Crowe 2018). The Greens, who suffered a 
brief setback in 2013, are attempting to expand their representation beyond the Senate to gain 
more seats in the HR. In Australia’s majoritarian party system, this would mean gain at Labor’s 
expense, so a Labor-Green alliance remains unlikely in the near term with the deep differences and 
animosity between the parties clear in speeches by their respective leaders (Gillard 2011; Milne 
2013). 
 
Table Three: Australian Greens' general election results 2010-2016 
 2010 2013 2016 
Percentage of votea  11.76HR/ 13.11S	 8.65HR/ 8.65S	 10.2HR/ 8.7S	
Seats won 1HR/9S 1HR/10S 1HR/9S 
Impact of supporting minority 
government 
Not applicable 3.1% loss HR 
4.46% loss S 
Not applicable 
a. House of Representatives (HR) result; Senate (S) result. 
Source: AEC (2016). 
 
Comparative trajectories 
The Swedish case study shows that support for minority government was a stepping stone that after 
sixteen years led the Greens to full partnership in coalition government, with no significant electoral 
harm experienced until coalition including ministries was achieved for the first time. The New 
Zealand case confirms that support for minority government was more often a halfway house, with 
electoral setbacks, but also that, after seventeen years, it led to an L-G Alliance with Labour and 
ultimately ministries for the first time. The Australian case study shows that this very recent first-
time experience of the Greens supporting minority government in a majoritarian, two-party 
preferred Westminster system is currently a road to nowhere. These three situations are obviously 
quite different and each is subject to change. However, to date there have been several constants: 
the incrementally increasing Green vote over the last two decades notwithstanding rises and fallsvii; 
the incrementally decreasing vote for social democrats (although not always going to the Greens); 
and the increasing sophistication of support arrangements where Greens support minority 
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governments. The cases also show the stability, if not ease, of these arrangements, and that any 
electoral cost to Green parties from supporting minority government is not lasting, nor does it 
preclude repeat arrangements (Table Four). Sweden and New Zealand show, furthermore, that it 
took almost two decades of working with the social democrats to build trust and gain ministries for 
the first time, although the Greens have struggled to make an impact in these.  
 The differing outcomes can be explained in terms of differing party systems, differing 
institutional and behavioural contexts, leadership styles and historical relations between the parties 
that offer differing opportunities for, and constraints upon, Green parties supporting government. 
The extent to which a minority government needs Green party support is also significant, but will 
vary markedly over time both within and between countries. Nevertheless, green-social democratic 
relations are key to the differing minority government support arrangements involving Green parties 
in Sweden, New Zealand and Australia. In Sweden, a more comfortable relationship in a consensual 
context has evolved between Greens and Social Democrats, leading to a minority coalition, than in 
New Zealand and Australia. In New Zealand, there is residual distrust with the Greens kept at a 
distance, and, in Australia’s adversarial majoritarian political context, there is enduring animosity as 
the Greens threaten Labor’s electoral support and status as a major party (Crowe 2018). 
 Having compared and contrasted experiences of Greens supporting minority government, 
we next consider what this transitioning closer to government delivered in terms of various 
categories of recognisable policy gains. 
 
Table Four:   
Green support of minority government: systems and political trajectory 
 Sweden – stepping stone New Zealand – halfway house Australia – road to nowhere 
 
Type of electoral 
system 
Proportional Mixed-member proportional HR – Preferential 
Senate –Proportional 
Trajectory –  
% Vote in 
parliament 
 
a) From 4% (1988) to a 
high of 7.3% (2010) to 
4.3% (2018). 
 
a) From 5.16/4.21%a	(1999) to 
a high of 11% (2011) to 6.3% 
(2017). 
 
a) From 2.14%HR/ 2.17%S 
(1998) to a high of 
11.6%HR/13.11%S to 
10.2%HR/ 8.7%S (2016) 
 
Transition to 
coalition? 
 
Yes – in 2014 to coalition 
partners with ministries in 
minority government with 
SAP d. 
Not quite – 2016 Labour-Green 
Alliance in opposition. This 
delivered ministries outside of 
government in 2017. 
No 
Social-democratic 
party share of vote 
From 1998-2018 – from 
36.4% to 28.4%. 
From 1999-2017 – from 
38.74% to 36.89%. 
From 1996-2016 – in HR 
from 38.75% (46.37TPP c) to 
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34.73% (49.64%TPP); in S 
from 37.31% to 29.79%. 
 a The first percentage is the party list result, the second for individual electorates. 1999 is the only election at which the 
Greens achieved an electorate seat. Source:  NZEC (2017). 
bHR – House of Representatives; S – Senate. 
cTPP – Two-party preferred. The effect of the preferential system inflating the major party vote can be seen. 
dSAP – The social-democratic Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet party. 
 
Crossing the ‘policy impact’ threshold?  
In each of the Swedish, New Zealand and Australian case studies social-democratic parties short of 
a majority sought assurances from the Greens of their support, at times offering policy concessions 
in return (see Table Five). Instances of some of the Swedish and New Zealand policy outcomes are 
well documented and analysed by Bale and Dann (2002), Bale (2003), Bale and Bergman (2006a; 
2006b) and Bale and Blomgren (2008). Their analysis, besides inspiring this research, has 
confirmed that, contrary to the traditional office-seeking accounts, these Green parties are 
classically ‘policy-seeking’: entering parliaments as advocates for ecology, the environment, social 
justice and the future (Gahrton 2015) but that their influence in minority government situations 
varies. However, it is not easy to attribute policy influence to the Greens because, as is observed 
where Greens join coalitions, ‘[n]ot necessarily every policy change in line with Green demands 
that occurred during their period in office can be ascribed to their influence’ (Rihoux and Rüdig 
2006: S16). There is also an atmosphere of policy competitiveness between the government and 
support parties, in the rush for example to take credit for the same policy, or where the government 
co-opts and then ‘owns’ a Green proposal (Bale and Bergman 2006a).  
 
Table Five:  
Details of support agreements 
 Sweden New Zealand Australia 
Type of support agreement Co-operation on policy; 
1998 – written, general, 
with economic, financial 
and policy cooperation; 
2002 – written, detailed, 
policy, resourcing, access 
and coordination contract. 
 
2014 – The Swedish 
Greens formed coalition 
minority government with 
1999 – unwritten cooperation; 
Greens undertook to support 
supply/confidence; 
2002 – written, relatively 
detailed; cooperation on 
policy: Greens agreed to 
abstain on supply/confidence; 
2005 – written; policy 
concessions; Greens 
undertook to support 
supply/confidence. 
2010 
Written; Greens 
undertook to support 
confidence and supply 
in exchange for 
procedural changes 
and government action 
on three policies. 
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the Social Democrats 
(which saw a marginal loss 
of support for both parties 
at the 2018 election). 
2017 – written, detailed; 
cooperation on policy; Greens 
undertook to support 
supply/confidence. 
Agreement lasted full term 
of Parliament? 
Yes in each case 1999 – slightly early election 
due to differences over GM; 
2002 and 2005 – yes. 
2017– (continuing). 
2010 – Greens offered 
confidence/supply 
until 2013 election but 
broke with government 
5 months earlier over 
policy differences. 
Sources: AG-ALP 2010; Bale and Bergman 2006b; Liddy 2010; NZLP and GPANZ 2017. 
 
Here we introduce the notion of a ‘policy impact threshold’ to focus attention on the policy efforts 
and outcomes of Green parties supporting minority government, further to the relevance (Pederson 
1982) of achieving support status. In the absence of greater clarity as to what policy influence may 
be in these circumstances, we are, in this instance, considering it in terms of: signature reforms or 
key achievements sought by the Greens in return for supporting minority government; 
parliamentary and policy-based process reforms that Greens routinely seek; and crash through or 
crash reforms that are contentious and can make or break a governing arrangement (Crowley 2003). 
These reforms, and indeed all policy achievements, are difficult to precisely identify and categorize, 
so we have at least chosen three distinctly differing reform types that enable a qualitative discussion 
of policy outcomes over the period of the respective governments. Strom (1990: 23; 26) 
acknowledges that supporting minority government offers an opportunity for a minor party to 
achieve some policy leverage. However, thus far there are no systematic measures of policy 
influence in these circumstances. 
We can nevertheless learn what the Greens were seen to have gained as key achievements, 
or thought themselves that they gained, from supporting government. We can also reflect upon the 
lesser-recognized reforms of parliamentary and other processes that were adopted as a consequence 
of the Greens supporting minority government. And, importantly, we argue, we can reflect upon the 
policy frustrations felt by Green support parties that may have precipitated the end of the support 
arrangement or minority government. There are lessons to be learned from failed policy influence 
or policy disputes between support parties and minority governments in terms of what these parties 
stand for, but also ways in which such disputes can be better managed in future arrangements. 
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Signature Green Reforms 
Between 1998-2002 the Swedish Greens’ support of minority government delivered policy 
outcomes ‘close to exceeding the capacity of the Greens to dream up projects’ in eco-taxation, 
nature protection, regional spending, energy, transport, building, agriculture and forestry (Bale and 
Bergman 2006a: 201). Even as the Greens were pleased with the scope and funding of these 
projects (Bale and Bergman 2006a), they were critical of the government’s carbon dioxide 
emissions target, and on lack of a timetable for decommissioning nuclear power (Elander 2000), 
both signature issues for the party. They regard ‘nuclear decommissioning, international solidarity 
and peace, and alternatives to the traditional growth economy’ as ‘core issues’ to which discussions 
and involvement with government must be drawn back (Gahrton and Aylward 2010: 4). Many 
Greens proposals were either only partially supported or, in the case of those more threatening to 
the economic and geo-political status quo, rejected outright by the SAP, for example a Tobin tax 
and banning genetic modification (Bale and Bergman 2006a). Their ongoing failure to achieve 
nuclear decommissioning (Gahrton and Aylward 2010) reflects the difficulties of achieving 
signature reforms, particularly those of a transformative nature, as could be seen during the 2014-
2018 coalition with the social democrats (Orange 2018). However, early in the coalition, the Greens 
claimed a number of achievements, climate-smart housing, a 100% renewable energy target, 
enhanced environmental protection, investment in education, and providing a global role model in 
terms of feminism, the environment and human rights by ending military cooperation with Saudi 
Arabia (Miljöpartiet de Gröna 2014).  
For the New Zealand Greens, the banning of genetically modified food is a significant but 
failed reform aim. After achieving a Royal Commission and a voluntary moratorium process in 
2000 (Hobbs 2000), they fell out with the Labour minority government over making the 
moratorium a pre-condition of their continued support beyond the 2002 election (Bale and 
Blomgren 2008). This overshadowed their policy gains during the first term of supporting Labour, 
which, although including some that appealed to their constituency (Bale and Dann 2002), were 
otherwise financially and symbolically minimal (Bale and Bergman 2006a). The Greens party itself, 
though, reported more substantial achievements, such as NZD$31.4 million in environmental, 
health and education funding with energy efficiency the legislative centrepiece (2000-2001) and 
NZD$30 million funding for further Green initiatives in 2002 (GPANZ 2016). While Bale and 
Bergman (2006a) point out the Greens’ failure to influence policy after their 2002 GMO walk-out, 
achievements noted by the Greens (GPANZ 2016) from supporting government include their 
successful call for the government to buy back the nation’s rail tracks (2003), initiatives in 
sustainable transport, and their achievement in the 2005-2008 term of around NZD$138 million for 
programs such as Buy Kiwi Made, energy efficiency, climate change research, school nutrition and 
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further community, education, health and environmental initiatives. While the NZ Greens achieved 
no signature reforms, such as a ban on GMOs, they did make progress on areas of core interest, 
such as energy efficiency, sustainable transport and public infrastructure. Their achievement of the 
climate change and conservation portfolios in 2017, and Labour’s support for Green priorities 
(NZLP and GPANZ 2017), may still see signature reforms achieved. 	
The Australian Greens’ experience was very different, from New Zealand’s in particular, in the 
sense of having twenty years of state-level experience of supporting minority governments behind 
them when they struck their agreement to support Labor in 2010. Lessons had been learned about 
contract parliamentarianism from repeat experiences at the subnational level starting in Tasmania in 
1989 (Pybus and Flanagan 1990) and the Greens placed their emphasis in 2010 on achieving 
signature reform. In return for their support (i.e. supply and confidence) of the Labor minority 
government, the Australian Greens received policy deals and procedural concessions, providing, 
amongst other things, the introduction of national carbon pricing and national dental health care as 
signature reforms (Liddy 2010). Action on climate change had been their top priority for many 
years, and, following years of government recalcitrance, inadequate action, and policy failure, 
minority government gave them the opportunity to achieve it (Jozo 2012). Meanwhile dental health 
reform was a social policy win for the Greens (Liddy 2010), although the subsequent Coalition 
government repealed both this and the Clean Energy Act. Otherwise the Greens claim campaigning 
efforts for environmental, welfare, social justice and accountability reform as their attempts to make 
a difference during their support of Labor government (Australian Greens 2013). 
	
Parliamentary and policy-based process reforms  
By including various process reforms, for example access to ministers, parliamentary staff and other 
resources, agreements between governments and support parties can help ensure effective 
government while maintaining political distinctiveness (Boston and Bullock 2010; Griffith 2010). 
These agreements between minority governments and Green support parties in Sweden and New 
Zealand, have become ‘longer and more specific’ over time as the system of ‘minority governance’ 
has evolved (Bale and Bergman 2006b: 432). This has included increasingly clear process reforms 
that would see the Greens better resourced and taken more seriously by the government as well as 
reforms to improve the processes of parliament itself (McCann 2012). Such reforms are critical to 
enhanced policy impact for Green parties, for example for prioritising either a specific reform such 
as carbon pricing, a process to investigate reform such as a ban on genetically modified food, or 
areas of policy cooperation like eco-taxation. They can also document the issues on which the 
Greens and the government will cooperate, those on which they agree to disagree, policy 
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concessions that have been made, and the processes by which to explore others (Greens/ALP 2010). 
Green parties in Sweden and New Zealand have used such agreements to ensure increased access to 
and consultation with the government and public sector (Bale and Bergman 2006b) and to clarify 
collective responsibility in relation to portfolio responsibilities (NZLP and GPANZ 2017). In 
Australia, the government signed a further Agreement for a better parliament with the Greens and 
independents to reduce partisanship, secure their involvement in parliamentary process, set up an 
independent Parliamentary Budget Office and investigate the establishment of a National Integrity 
Commissioner (DPS 2013),  
 
Crash or Crash Through Reforms 
Support parties’ lack of policy influence can be identified in ‘crash through or crash’ reforms, when 
the actions of the governing party go so much against the core principles of the support party that it 
feels impelled to take drastic action, potentially threatening the support arrangement (Crowley 
2003). The government may seek backing for legislation or policy that cuts very much against the 
support party’s principles, fully aware that the reform will either fail, and with it possibly the 
government, or crash through the obstacles and succeed. So there can be brinksmanship on both 
sides, and the looming context of the next election can play a part as the government and those 
supporting it return to appealing to their bases, which a battle over contentious reform can do. 
Either the government or the support party may feel compelled by bad polling, for example, to build 
popularity by distinguishing itself from its minority-government partner(s) and their policies.  
This has not been the experience thus far in Sweden despite the lack of progress on the 
signature issue of nuclear decommissioning.  Bale and Bergman find no political drama between the 
SAP and the Swedish Greens, beyond both occasionally voting with the Opposition (2006a: 199), 
possibly because the Greens’ policy gains were already quite substantial (2006a: 201), and politics 
in general is more consensual in Sweden. By contrast, the issues that broke the Greens’ minority 
government support arrangement in New Zealand in 2002 was a parliamentary vote to end the 
moratorium on GMO crops (Bale 2003), and in Australia, in 2013, the government’s watering down 
of a new mining tax that was intended to have raised significant revenue (Milne 2013), both issues 
that played out in a pre-election context. In neither case did the Greens force an early election, 
although the New Zealand Labour government called an election several months early and used the 
GMO issue to campaign against the Greens. In Australia, the Greens used their inability to sway the 
government on environmental protection, wilderness issues, coal-seam gas and coal exportation to 
justify abandoning their agreement (Milne 2013: 7). But both Green parties still guaranteed supply 
and confidence until the next election.  
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Discussion - Stepping Stone, Halfway House or Road to Nowhere?  
This review of Greens supporting minority government reveals similarities and differences between 
the experiences in three countries in terms of leading to participation in subsequent governments 
and delivering Green policy gains and enhanced influence. When viewed over the last two decades, 
the Green vote in each place can be seen to have been on a long-term upward trajectory, despite 
peaks and dips, most notably upwards in Australia and New Zealand whilst less so in Sweden until 
2018 (Table Four). In terms of how support for the Greens correlates with their support of minority 
government, support rose in each of the elections following the end of this experience in Sweden (in 
2006 and 2010) and New Zealand (in 2008, 2011 and 2014). But it fell significantly at first in 
Australia (in 2013), in line with the swing against the government, before rising again at the next 
election in the lower House of Representatives if not in the Senate. In both Sweden and New 
Zealand future research will examine any electoral consequences of the Greens forming their 
alliances with the social democrat/labour parties and accepting ministries, respectively within and 
outside of cabinets in minority governments (Espiner 2018; Orange 2018).  
Although Greens have supported conservative governments (Crowley and Tighe 2017), in the 
instances we have examined here they supported only social-democratic governments, almost 
exclusively by way of increasingly sophisticated contract parliamentarism, and almost exclusively 
running full term. The ‘toleration’ model has thus largely outgrown the lack of viability identified 
by Rüdig (2002: 29) after the repeated experiences and lessons learned over the last two decades. In 
each instance the Greens did achieve independence, although they struggled with their lack of 
influence, and learned the need to work with other parties and independents with varying degrees of 
success, just as parties in coalitions do. In none of the minority support situations was the 
government reliant only upon the Greens, although in Sweden and New Zealand, at least, the 
Greens have since emerged as natural partners in terms of alliances with the social democratic/ 
labour parties. The flexibility in the L-G Alliance in New Zealand did, however, allow the Labour 
party to form coalition minority government with New Zealand First, which otherwise would have 
formed government with the incumbent conservative National party. The very different models 
adopted by social democrats in Sweden and New Zealand, with Greens having ministries in 
contrasting circumstances, will offer further relative lessons about political and policy success for 
the Greens in these minority government situations.	
Each of our case studies also shows that Green parties supporting minority governments have 
been crossing Pederson’s threshold of relevance by having an impact upon government formation 
and with it have earned the opportunity to cross the policy impact threshold that we have identified. 
By undertaking comparative-historical analysis, we can appreciate this development as a stepping-
stone, halfway house and road to nowhere in varying circumstances at varying times. Whilst we 
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have seen that Green parties taking this less direct pathway have had sustained political success as 
minor parties, we have also identified various policy results, including potential impact with the 
recent achievement of ministries. We have found, however, that policy impact is a nuanced concept, 
overshadowed in the early days of Greens supporting minority government by debate over signature 
reforms to the neglect of lesser achievements. We explored the nuance in policy outcomes between 
signature achievements, process reforms; and crash through or crash reforms. Whilst there is most 
attention given to, often failed, efforts to achieve signature reforms, we found that this was to the 
neglect of important lesser reforms, including process and governance-based reforms, and the lack 
of influence and policy differences that can be identified where Greens walk away from 
government. 
 
Conclusions 
Green parties supporting, or tolerating, minority government was initially not considered a viable 
model of Green government involvement (Rüdig 2002: 29). By adopting a comparative-historical 
perspective, however, we have shown that this is no longer so. As a first-time experience, it is more 
a ‘toleration’ than a cooperative arrangement, in Australia for example, but repeat experiences have 
strengthened ties and led to alliances and coalitions. The Swedish study shows that support of 
minority government can offer a minor party a stepping-stone from Pederson’s representation to 
relevance thresholds. We see, however, a continuing halfway-house situation in New Zealand (Bale 
and Bergman 2006a) and, currently, a road to nowhere for the Australian Greens in terms of 
supporting subsequent governmentsviii. There are various lessons to be learnt, therefore, from these 
differing circumstances, where a key factor has been Green-social democratic relations, and lessons 
for Green parties will continue to be learnt post recent and ongoing arrangements.	
 The Swedish, New Zealand and Australian arrangements show that where Green parties are 
asked to support government for the first time, a toleration or ‘arms’ length’ arrangement that 
delivers clear policy gains should not precipitate long-term electoral cost. But it may deliver short-
term electoral cost depending upon the type of minority government that the Greens are supporting 
and the extent to which the Greens are insulated from any government unpopularity. There should 
be a written agreement governing the arrangement and detailing the delivery of policy gains, the 
management of inter-party relations, access to government and legitimate escape clauses. If the 
long-term focus of Green parties is upon government participation, then periods of supporting 
government offer the opportunity for building trust between parties and learning the lessons of 
governing. Such arrangements can run full term, as they have in our case study countries, and can 
offer a stepping-stone into fuller participation in government. In Sweden and New Zealand, the 
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Greens have stepped up by accepting ministries, and future research will scrutinise and compare 
these arrangements in terms of policy gains and the subsequent impact on party trajectories. 	
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i  Although in many instances this support is also necessity-based.	
ii  At the time of writing, Greens recently held, and now hold, ministries in and Sweden and New Zealand 
respectively, which provides the basis for future comparative analysis beyond our scope here.	
iii  As the successor to the Values Party, the world's first national Green Party, which formed in 1972.	
iv  The 2002 election was seven months early, with the Greens indirectly implicated over GM.	
v  With independents Andrew Wilkie, Rob Oakeshott and Tony Windsor.	
vi  The Greens continued to keep the government in office by delivering supply and confidence in parliament.	
     vii   But see Table Four for the 2018 Swedish election results and the cost to the Greens of coalition government.	
viii   Note however that the Australian Greens have significant policy influence in the popularly elected Senate.	
